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BANKRUPTCY-DIsCHARGES-REASONS FOR DENIAL.-One of the
main objects of the Bankruptcy Act is to release the honest, though
insolvent, debtor from the burden of his obligations in the interests
of his family and the general public.' In the early bankruptcy acts
the discharge of the bankrupt may have been incidental to the more
important function, the providing for an equal distribution of his
goods among the bankrupt's creditors, but in many of the voluntary
cases arising under the present Bankruptcy Act, the administration
or distribution of the bankrupt's estate is completed before the
debtor files his petition for a discharge, and the sole object of the
debtor in originally filing a petition in bankruptcy is that he may
be relieved of the burden of his debts.2 The grounds upon which a
discharge may be denied are set out specifically in the present Act.3
These provisions are to be liberally construed in the bankrupt's
interest, and all implications and doubts are to be resolved in his
favor.4 Since it was the purpose of the law to relieve honest debtors
the privilege of discharge is not to be denied by a construction botb
harsh and at variance with the general policy of the statute.5
Application for the discharge may be made by the bankrupt at
any time after the expiration of one month from the date of adjudi-
cation and within twelve months thereafter.6 This time limit may be
extended six months if the bankrupt can show that he was unavoid-
ably prevented from filing the application within the usual time.7
When the application for discharge is not filed until more than
eighteen months after the adjudication the bankruptcy court no
longer has the power to pass upon it." There is no obligation on the
referee to notify the bankrupt or his attorney of the expiration of
the time for filing the application; the bankrupt and his attorney
must keep themselves informed of that to their own peril.9
1 "The determination of the status of the honest and unfortunate debtor by his
liberation from encumbrance on future exertion is a matter of public concern
** * ." Hanover Nat. Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 192, 22 Sup. Ct. 857, 46
L.ed. 1113 (1902). "It is the purpose of the Bankrupt Act to convert the assets
of the bankrupt into cash for distribution among creditors and then to relieve
the honest debtor from the weight of oppressive indebtedness and permit him
to start afresh from the obligations and responsibilities consequent upon busi-
ness misfortunes." Williams v. U. S. Fidelity Co., 236 U.S. 549, 555, 35 Sup. Ct.
289, 59 L.ed. 713 (1915).2Hardie v. Swafford Bros. Dry Goods Co., 165 Fed. 588, 20 L.R.A. (x.s.) 785
(C.C.A. 5th, 1908).3 Section 14(b), 30 STAT. 550 (1898), 32 STAT. 797 (1903), 36 STAT. 839 (1910),
44 STAT. 663 (1926), 11 U.S.C.A. 32(b) (1934).
4See Webb v. Lynchburg Shoe Co., 107 Va. 807, 60 S.E. 130 (1908), and also
Hardie v. Swafford Bros. Dry Goods Co., 165 Fed. 588, 20 L.R.A. (N.s.)
785 (C.C.A. 5th, 1908).
5 Gilpin v. Merchants Nat. Bank, 165 Fed. 607, 20 L.R.A. (N.s.) 1023 (C.C.A.,
3rd, 1908).
6 Section 14(a), 30 STAT. 550 (1898), 11 U.S.C.A. 32(a) (1934).
7 Section 14(a), supra note 6. What amounts to unavoidable prevention lies
within the discretion of the trial judge. ln re Walter, 249 Fed. 187 (C.C.A. 7th,
1918). Misunderstanding between the bankrupt and his attorney or a mistake
of law on the part of the attorney has been held to be excusable. In re Chur-
chill, 197 Fed. 111 (E.D. Wis. 1912).
sin re Wagner, 139 Fed. 87 (D. C. Nev. 1905).
9 1n re Knauer, 133 Fed. 805, (N. D. Iowa 1904).
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If the bankrupt has sought a release from his debts within the
prescribed time, the release can be denied him only for the reasons
set out in the Bankruptcy Act.10 There is nothing in the Act which
expressly precludes the debtor's getting a discharge affecting obli-
gations listed once before with a petition in bankruptcy upon which
the debtor had been adjudicated a bankrupt merely because the
debtor had not filed an application for a discharge after the adjudi-
cation and within the statutory time. The fifth ground for denial of a
discharge as set forth in the Bankruptcy Act refers only to previous
discharges within six years before the filing of the application for a dis-
charge in a second proceeding."" It can readily be seen that the idea of
res judicata is important with respect to those debts for which a dis-
charge has been refused in the first proceeding if the debtor lists the
same debts when he or his creditors begin a second proceeding in bank-
ruptcy against his estate. 2 But it is not a necessary corollary to
that proposition that a debtor should be barred from subsequent
relief in bankruptcy on the same scheduled obligations when he had
neglected to apply for a discharge within the time set by statute
after the adjudication on the first petition. There are some bank-
ruptcy courts which have been willing to prescribe that such neglect,
even if it is inadvertent on the part of the debtor, has the same
effect on the debtor's subsequent position in a bankruptcy court as
if the debtor had petitioned for a discharge and been denied it, and
that any subsequent discharge for the same debts following adjudi-
cation on another petition in bankruptcy is barred whether the sub-
sequent petition is filed within six years or at any other time after
the filing of the first petition in bankruptcy.' 3 These courts say that
failure to apply within tfie period set out in the Act is equivalent
to a judgment by default and establishes conclusively, so far as the
creditors then scheduled are concerned, that the bankrupt is not
entitled to a discharge.14
This line of reasoning reads into the Bankruptcy Act a provision
which is not literally there, viz., that failure to file an application for a
discharge within the time permitted by the Act bars a subsequent
discharge for the debts scheduled when the first petition in bank-
ruptcy was filed.' 5 One court which has had occasion to work out
this additional restriction has explained that Congress must have
intended to impose as a condition precedent to the debtor's getting
a discharge, the filing of a petition therefor within the time pre-
scribed, or the legislature would not have prescribed in the Act a
time limit within which the debtor must make application.' Where
10 Section 14(b), 30 STAT. 550 (1898), 32 STAT. 797 (1903), 36 STAT. 839 (1910),
44 STAT. 663 (1926), 11 U.S.C.A. 32(b) (1934).
"Section 14 (b) (5), 30 STAT. 550 (1898), 11 U.S.C.A. 32 (b) (5) (1934).
12 "Undoubtedly, as in all judicial proceedings, an adjudication refusing a dis-
charge in bankruptcy, finally determines, for all times and in all courts, as
between those parties or privies to it, the facts upon which the refusal was
based." Bluthenthal v. Jones, 208 U.S. 64, 66, 28 Sup. Ct. 192, 52 L.ed. 390
(1908). In accord, In re Royal, 113 Fed. 140 (E.D.N.C. 1902).
13 In re Loughran, 218 Fed. 619 (C.C.A. 3rd, 1914) ; In re Brislin, 10 F. Supp. 181
(N.D.N.Y. 1934).
14 See also Siebert v. Dahlberg, 218 Fed. 793 (C.C.A. 8th, 1914).
1 See In re Skaats, 233 Fed. 817 (S.D. Ala. 1914).16 In re Loughran, 218 Fed. 619 (C.C.A. 3rd, 1914).
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a debtor has been denied a discharge in any proceeding for some
reason involving his own misconduct the matter of discharge from
the debts then scheduled is forever settled. There has been a deter-
mination on the merits. The debtor ought not be discharged from
these same debts in any proceeding begun thereafter." But it is
submitted that if the debtor has merely failed to file an application
for a discharge in a previous proceeding there has been no determi-
nation with respect to any misconduct on his part and he ought
not be barred.18
It has been argued that the true basis for refusing a discharge
from the debts previously scheduled is that Congress by Section
14 (a) intended to relieve creditors from the necessity of remaining
prepared for an unreasonable length of time to prove the exist-
ence of grounds for the denial of a discharge under Section 14 (b)
and that this intent would be practically nullified if the bankrupt
were permitted to evade the bar by instituting a second proceed-
iing.19 It has been held that the right of a debtor to a subsequent
Jischarge covering the same debts is not precluded even though he
lid fail to apply for a discharge in the first proceeding within the
time permitted. 20 In this case the court contended there has been
no judicial determination with respect to the debtor's claim. Never-
theless, it is probably the majority rule that the mere failure to file
application for a discharge within the time set has the same effect
as though the discharge were actually denied.2 ' The United States
Supreme Court has never directly passed upon the matter. In Fresh-
man v. Adkins,"2 the court said that a pending application still undis-
posed of serves to abate a second application so far as the same
debts are concerned, and that the bankruptcy court may take judi-
cial notice of the records of former bankruptcies of the applicant
before the court to ascertain whether he may proceed.
Suppose a bankrupt has been granted a discharge from his debts
in 1920. According to the Bankruptcy Act he is not permitted to
obtain another discharge from any subsequent debts within a period
of six years thereafter. In 1923, however, a second petition in bank-
ruptcy is filed. He schedules the debts which have accrued since
1920 and makes a second appearance in the bankruptcy court. The
debtor does not make an application for a discharge in this proceed-
ing. Perhaps he has discovered that he cannot obtain a discharge
now because of the six-year provision, or perhaps his attorney re-
17 "A proceeding in bankruptcy is in the nature of a bill in equity in which the
bankrupt is complainant and the creditors are defendants. Where a discharge
is refused on the merits the judgment inures to the benefit of all the creditors.
Both parties are bound by it and neither party should be permitted to try the
same question again; it is res judicata." In re Fiegenbaum, 121 Fed. 69, 70
(C.C.A. 2nd, 1903).
is Cf In re Elkin, 175 Fed. 64 (C.C.A. 2nd, 1909); In re Lyons, 287 Fed. 602
(E.D.N.Y. 1922); (1932) 45 HARV. L. REv. 1110.
19 See (1920) 33 HARV. L. REV. 978.
20 I1 re Skaats, 233 Fed. 817 (S.D. Ala. 1914).
21 In re Loughran, 218 Fed. 619 (C.C.A. 3rd, 1914); Siebert v. Dahlberg, 218
Fed. 793 (C.C.A. 8th, 1914); In re Brislin, 10 F. Supp. 181 (N.D.N.Y. 1934);
In re Pullian, 171 Fed. 595 (E. D. Tenn. 1909); In re Von Borries, 168 Fed.
718 (E.D. Wis. 1909).
22269 U.S. 64, 46 Sup. Ct. 41, 70 L. ed. 193 (1925).
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fuses to proceed. In any event the debtor now waits until 1927 when
he files another voluntary petition in bankruptcy. In 1923 and in
1927 his non-exempt estate which he has turned over to the bank-
ruptcy court's administration is comparatively small in substance.
After the adjudication on the petition filed in 1927 the debtor makes
application to be released from his debts and he files this petition
within the statutory period. Is he to be denied a discharge from the
debts accrued since 1920 because he failed to get a discharge from a
portion of them in a proceeding which was prematurely brought?
Has he committed any offense which the Bankruptcy Act states to
be ground for denial of a discharge? Can it be said that his right
to a discharge of those debts accrued before 1923 has been settled
against him? Unless the courts which have laid down what is per-
haps the "majority rule" would distinguish between the case where
the debtor has merely neglected to file an application for a dis-
charge and the case where he could not have obtained relief because
the whole proceeding was prematurely begun, the answers would
have to be, Yes.
2 3
The leading case upon which some courts have built up their
conclusions as to the effect of a failure to file an application for a
discharge decided that a bankrupt should not obtain a discharge
from the same debts scheduled with a second petition while the first
proceeding was still pending.24 In the hypothetical case suggested
above the first proceeding in fact had been abandoned. In the "lead-
ing case" it appeared that the debtor had failed to comply with an
order of the referee in a previous proceeding begun against him by
his creditors on an involuntary petition in bankruptcy. The order of
the referee had never been modified. The debtor had never complied
with it. He could not get a discharge until he should comply with
the referee's order.2,5 The debtor never did file a petition for a dis-
charge in that proceeding. He did, however, file a voluntary petition
some months thereafter in another division of the same bankruptcy
court asking to be adjudged a bankrupt. He listed the same debts
with the second petition in bankruptcy that he had listed in the first
proceeding. He was adjudged a bankrupt but his petition for a dis-
charge was denied. The decision in that case was obviously sound.
The court could have done nothing else. But any language in that
opinion about the consequences of a failure of a bankrupt to file a
petition for a discharge must be taken to be limited by the precise
facts of the case. Some of the cases frequently referred to as
"precedents" were decided under earlier bankruptcy or insolvency
acts. 28 And any case, in which it appears that a debtor is denied a
discharge because a bankruptcy court had already refused to grant
him one for the same debts in an earlier proceeding, is simply not
in point. In those cases where the courts have refused to bar the
debtor by reason of his failing to file an application for a discharge
on a previous petition it will be found that the courts have inquired
23 But compare Prudential Loan & Finance Co. v. Robarts, 52 F. (2d) 918
(C.C.A. 5th, 1931).24 Kuntz v. Young, 131 Fed. 719 (C.C.A. 8th, 1904).
25 Section 14(b) (6), 30 STAT. 550 (1898), 11 U.S.C.A. 32 (b) (6) (1934).
26 See In re Drisko, Fed. Cas. No. 4,086 at 1092 (C.C. Mass. 1876) ; also Gilbert
v. Hebard, (Mass. 1844) 8 Metc. 129.
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into the conduct of the debtor and have found at most delay on the
part of his attorney or some other excusable reason for the failure
to file.
2 7
If a bankrupt files a voluntary petition in a bankruptcy court
within six years from the date of a prior discharge he would be
denied relief from the burden of his current obligations. The Bank-
ruptcy Act so provides in Section 14 (b). Nor is that because of any
conduct on the part of the debtor which has hurt his position. The
purpose of this section is to prevent the debtor's taking advantage
of the provisions of the Act too often.2 It is not intended to bar
him forever. If a bankrupt is denied a discharge in one proceeding
because of a previous discharge within six years it is because of a
temporary disability. When the requisite six years have elapsed and
the disability is removed there is no reason, at least as suggested in
the Act itself, why the previous denial should be taken to bar a
discharge covering debts which have accrued since the previous
.effective discharge.
The Bankruptcy Act contemplates that a party may take advan-
tage of its provisions more than once. Where no creditor has acted
to his disadvantage because of the debtor's delay it is difficult to
accept any line of reasoning worked out to support the holding that
mere neglect or failure to file an application for a discharge in one
proceeding should forever prevent the debtor's escaping from the
burden of his debts. In the light of the literal provisions of the Act
it would be difficult to accept any explanation for even a six-year
delay from the burden of his debts merely because of the filing of a
petition in bankruptcy at some previous time without the debtor's
asking for a discharge.
OLIVER H. BASSUENFR
27 Prudential Loan & Finance Co. v. Robarts, 52 F. (2d) 918 (C.C.A. 5th, 1931);
In re Skaats, 233 Fed. 817 (S.D. Ala. 1914); In re Lyons, 287 Fed. 602 (E.D.
N.Y. 1922).2 8Prudential Loan & Finance Co. v. Robarts, 52 F. (2d) 918 (C.C.A. 5th, 1931).
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